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Called Third Strike .... Your Outta Here....
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Sorry , No Dropped Third Strike Here Mr. Umpire

"Injustice fights with two weapons, force
 and fraud ... A common form of injustice
  is chicanery, that is, an oversubtle, in
  fact a fraudulent construction of the law."
                              Cicero - On Moral Duties

For those of you who may find this site disorganized
remember and be glad that none of this happened to you.
Most of the material that should be here for various reasons, is not.
Some will never be added to this site, and some will
be added when it becomes appropriate.

The following pictures are of my head and neck injuries and the 12 years of being a convicted felon without that being true it should also be noted these are not the only lies I've had to endure and other people have been hurt because of this dishonest and corrupt situation that grows everyday

Please understand that almost immediately after this 1978 incident the manipulation started
example: the backing up of the court date, this
was accomplished by stating it would be better
for "Steven" if he waited for a certain party to be
out of the District Attorney's office.... meantime
the injuries to arms, neck and head became
less noticeable with the hair hiding the worst
part of it.

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FRAUD: "An intentional perversion of the truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."
Black's Law Dictionary

CIVIL CONSPIRACY - 'The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the common design. . . . In such an action the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity.'' (Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 44, citing Mox Incorporated v. Woods (1927) 202 Cal. 675, 677-78.)' (Id. at 511.)

'Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate tortfeasors. Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be activated by the commission of an actual tort. ''A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting in damage.'' 'A bare agreement among two or more persons to harm a third person cannot injure the latter unless and until acts are actually performed pursuant to the agreement. Therefore, it is the acts done and not the conspiracy to do them which should be regarded as the essence of the civil action.' [para.s] By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy presupposes that the coconspirator is legally capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty.' (Allied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 510-11.)

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Bureaucracy defends
the status quo
long past the time
when the quo
has lost its status.

LAURENCE J. PETER

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Propagandists:



wield words

as nonviolent offensive

and defensive weapon system

that publicize,

conceal,

or misrepresent

the real source

to set stages properly,

exploit successes,

minimize failures,

and make the most of mixed results.



Cohesive programs,

which put collective "good" above self-interest,

solicit compliance and collaboration,

whether the objective is stability or subversion.



Divisive programs,

conversely,

seek to seperate individuals from groups and

groups

from each other or society at large.

Apathy,

panic,

disobedience,

desertion,

and surrender are typical objectives.

Psychological Operations:



may precede,

accompany,

replace,

or, follow applications of force,

constitute the planned use of propaganda

and physical action ( terrorism )

to influence the behavior of:

friendly,

enemy,

or neutral audiences

in support of politico-military aims.



Psyop Specialists:



target people who share predispositions.

Psyopers must master:

political,

economic,

cultural,

and topical subjects,

before they can skillfully tailor themes

to acquire and sustain attention of particular

target groups ( audiences ) and effectively

refute counter efforts.



EXCERPT FROM: U.S. AND SOVIET OPERATIONS

BY JOHN M. COLLINS, SENIOR SPECIALIST

IN NATIONAL DEFENSE, 23 DECEMBER 1986.

Subversion:



seeks to undermine the morale

and transfer the allegiance of

specific groups.

Disinformation commonly assists.

Competent employers not only make it seem

reasonable, but difficult for the duped to

ascertain the truth if they try.

Statements out of context,

unfair comparisons,

false alarms,

smear tactics,

oversimplified slogans,

and skewed cause/effect relationships

are representative techniques.

The best defense against psyops depends on

variables, but three rules of thumb seem

evident:



1) silence provides rivals little

incentive to desist ( stop );



2) vague rebuttals rarely are

beneficial;



3) hyperbole often boomerangs.



A steady flow of truthful information, which

most Americans advocate, is not automatically

the antidote for disinformation, because truth

can hurt as well as help.



EXCERPT FROM:

U.S. AND SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS,

BY JOHN M. COLLINS. SENIOR SPECIALIST

IN NATIONAL DEFENSE, 23 DEC 1986.

Title 18 U.S.C § 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigation.
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to–

(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;


(2) cause or induce any person to–


(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from–


(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;


(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense ... (3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal offense; or


(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation preceding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding;


or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(e) For the purposes of this section–

(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and


(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.


Title 18 U.S.C. § 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant.
(a) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for (1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or (2) any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense ..."

Title 18 U.S.C. § 111. Impeding certain officers or employees. Whoever ... intimidates, or interferes with any person ... while engaged in ... the performance of his official duties shall be fined ... or imprisoned ...

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Perjury generally. Whoever (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal ... willfully and contrary to such oath states ... any material matter which he does not believe to be true, he shall be fined ... or imprisoned ...

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1622. Subornation of perjury
Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Frauds and swindles.
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, .... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined ... or imprisoned .... or both.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 245. Federally protected activities.
(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with–

(1) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons [whistleblowers against corruption in government] from–
(B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States;
(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any agency of the United States.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 246. Deprivation of relief benefits
Whoever directly or indirectly deprives, attempts to deprive, or threatens to deprive any person of any employment, position, work, compensation, or other benefit provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes, on account of political affiliation [whistleblower] ... shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 241. Conspiracy against [civil] rights
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ... they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Creation of remedy. In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2202. Further relief. Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.

Treasonous Conduct

The definition of treason includes criminal attempts to destroy the lawful existence of government offices; a breach of allegiance, such as the allegiance to support the laws and Constitution of the United States.

Subversive Conduct

Subversive conduct is conduct that undermines and overthrows established authority of the government. Undermining the foundation of government. The judicial conduct that subverts the laws and Constitution of the United States, that obstructs justice, that aids and abets criminal activities, meet this definition.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals. (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

Note: The legislative intent to punish as a principal not only one who directly commits an offense and one who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" another to commit an offense, but also anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States. Case law decisions: Rothenburg v. United States, 1918, 38 S.Ct. 18, 245 U.S. 480, 62 L.Ed. 414, and United States v. Giles, 1937, 57 S.Ct. 340, 300 U.S. 41, 81 L.Ed. 493.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3. Accessory after the fact. Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States had been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.

CONSPIRACY

PINKERTON CHARGE (CONSPIRACY) - a jury instruction based on the doctrine that each member of a conspiracy is responsible for the actions of other members performed during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. If one member of a conspiracy commits a crime in furtherance of a conspiracy, the other members have also, under the law, committed the crime.

Legal definition of Conspiracy

Conspiracy. A combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act, or some act which is lawful in itself, but becomes unlawful when done by the concerted action of the conspirators, or for the purpose of using criminal or unlawful means to the commission of an act not in itself unlawful.
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. Model Penal Code, § 5.03.
Crime of conspiracy is distinct from the crime contemplated by the conspiracy (target crime), Corn. v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 509, 138 N.E. 296, 314, cert. denied, 262 U.S. 751, 43 S.Ct. 700, 67 L.Ed. 1214. Some jurisdictions do not require an overt act as an element of the crime, e.g. Corn. v. Harris, 232 Mass. 588, 122 N.E. 749.
A conspiracy may be a continuing one; actors may drop out, and others drop in; the details of operation may change from time to time; the members need not know each other or the part played by others; a member need not know all the details of the plan or the operations; he must, however, know the purpose of the conspiracy and agree to become a party to a plan to effectuate that purpose. Craig v. U. S., C.C.A.Cal., 81 F.2d 816, 822.
There are a number of federal statutes prohibiting specific types of conspiracy. See, eg., 18 U.S.C.A. 371. See also Chain conspiracy; Co-conspirator's rule; Combination in restraint of trade; Confederacy; Seditious conspiracy; Wharton Rule.
Chain conspiracy. Such conspiracy is characterized by different activities carried on with same subject of conspiracy in chain-like manner that each conspirator in chain-like manner performs a separate function which serves in the accomplishment of the overall conspiracy. Bolden v. State, 44 Md.App. 643, 410 A.2d 1085, 1091.
Civil conspiracy. The essence of a "civil conspiracy" is a concert or combination to defraud or cause other injury to person or property, which results in damage to the person or property of plaintiff. See also Civil conspiracy.
Overthrow of government. See Sedition.
Seditions conspiracy. See Sedition.
Conspiracy in restraint of trade. Term which describes all forms of illegal agreements such as boycotts, price fixing, etc., which have as their object interference with free flow of commerce and trade. See Antitrust acts; Clayton Act; Sherman Antitrust Act.
Conspirators. Persons partaking in conspiracy. See Conspiracy.
Conspire. To engage in conspiracy. Term carries with it the idea of agreement, concurrence and combination, and hence is inapplicable to a single person or thing, and one cannot agree or conspire with another who does not agree or conspire with him. See Conspiracy.
SOURCE: Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition

Sec. 1985. - Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights


(1) Preventing officer from performing duties


If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror


If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges


If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators

Sec. 1986. - Action for neglect to prevent


Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued

Battered Plaintiffs - injuries from hired guns and compliant courts
It is bad enough to suffer an injury at work, or the savage retribution routinely meted out to whistleblowers. But as is well known in whistleblowing circles, if the injured person then tries to obtain redress through the ‘justice’ system, they are likely to suffer further injury from the system itself- in some cases, more severe and damaging than the original one. This is such a problem, at this stage so insurmountable to the great majority of would-be plaintiffs, that my routine advice to patients wanting to try litigation is basically - "Don’t". However many still do; some really have no choice but to try; some are caught up with ‘hired guns’ while still employed, forced by the threat of losing their jobs for refusing to obey a lawful order. (If you want to dispute that the order is in fact lawful, of course you end up in court anyway.)

Hired guns

Hired gun psychiatrists are covered in more detail in my chapter on bullying in medico-legal examinations, in ‘Bullying, from backyard to boardroom’ (ed. McCarthy, Sheehan and Wilkie, 1996). There are hired guns in other medical specialties, but they appear to be most frequent, and most vicious, in psychiatry - probably because, as a ‘soft’ science, lacking the hard evidence of X-rays and tissue examination, psychiatry is more open to opinions, no matter how outrageous.

This is unfortunate for the victims on two counts: firstly, a psychiatric diagnosis carries a severe stigma in our society, and however sane the victim may in fact be, some mud can be expected to stick, particularly among their enemies. It is thus an extremely effective way to discredit the victim together with their complaints, and supposedly confidential reports are commonly overtly or covertly circulated where they can do most damage. Secondly, a psychiatric examination, on a traumatic issue, is often traumatic in itself because the patient is compelled to relive the trauma. This is acceptable for the purpose of therapy, but purely for medico-legal purposes will almost inevitably add another injury to the psyche. If the psychiatrist is an abusive hired gun, and if the patient is forced by the system, as many are, to see a number of them, the additional injury can be severe. Also most whistleblowers, and many Workers’ Compensation claimants, do develop psychiatric problems such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder, for which they will need help, usually from a psychiatrist. If the trust necessary for an effective therapeutic relationship has been damaged or destroyed by a traumatic earlier encounter with a hired gun psychiatrist, the effect can be devastating, and a condition that should have been relatively easy to treat can become crippling.

The two main situations where hired guns are employed are in whistleblowing cases, when the employer wants to discredit and if possible get rid of the employee; and in Workers’ Compensation cases where the employee is claiming for a psychiatric injury, and the employer wants to avoid liability. Whistleblowers can, and commonly do, end up in both situations, after the victimisation and harassment they are subjected to at work in due course causes a major depressive illness. However there are important differences in the two situations, especially the ‘diagnosis’.

Hired guns in whistleblowing

In this situation the employer will want a diagnosis that ‘proves’ the whistleblower is a nut-case, rat-bag, and troublemaker; that the issues on which they have blown the whistle can therefore be safely ignored; and they can justifiably dismiss or medically retire the whistleblower. The diagnosis in that case is almost invariably a paranoid personality disorder (i.e. the whistleblower has been misinterpreting or imagining both the malpractice and/or corruption they complained about, together with the harassment and victimisation that almost invariably follow someone making such complaints). Occasionally the hired gun can stretch the diagnosis to a paranoid illness, such as paranoid schizophrenia. This is uncommon in Australia, where we don’t (yet) have the convenient diagnosis used in Soviet psychiatry to deal with dissidents there. ‘Creeping’ or ‘sluggish’ schizophrenia was an illness confined to the USSR, with no symptoms apart from the urge to dissent:

"The presence of sluggish schizophrenia does not presuppose noticeable personality changes and the absence of such symptoms does not prove the absence of the illness itself."

"The morbid process develops very slowly so that its other manifestations remain imperceptible. Diagnostic difficulties increase if the subject relates in a formally correct way to the environment."

However this lack of symptoms, coupled with ‘reformist ideas’, particularly if expressed with ‘an unshakeable conviction of his own rightness’ was enough to land dissidents in the nightmare of psychiatric prison hospital, indefinitely, or until the administration of overdoses of psychiatric drugs and other ‘treatment’ led to the ‘fading away of delirious conceptions’ - i.e. willingness under that duress to agree to toe the Party line.

In Australia, the diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder has some striking similarities. For this diagnosis to be valid, a patient must have exhibited symptoms throughout their adult life, and in all areas of it, not just at work. Most whistleblowers are well above average as employees, and until they blow the whistle have exemplary work records, as well as being unremarkable in their family and personal lives. That is, there is no evidence to support the diagnosis of a paranoid - or any other - pre-existing personality disorder, and of course thinking that you are being persecuted once you really are being victimised is not a sign of mental illness. But just as lack of evidence wasn’t a problem in the USSR, it often presents no problems here:

"There is no past history of personality difficulties which I am aware of and from a psychiatric point of view I cannot establish the presence throughout his life of personality traits which significantly affected his work or social life. This is not surprising given Mr W’s defensiveness and projection of all his difficulties onto the Department."

"I found Mr T. to be very cooperative in the interviews and to have a cheerful and pleasant manner. This contrasted with accounts given to me by others, mentioned above, that he can at times be very belligerent and uncooperative. It was easy to see that he would be able to present his viewpoints in a very plausible manner to people who were in relatively brief contact with him, or who did not seriously challenge his statements."

Hired guns here, like their Soviet counterparts, have problems with the whistleblower’s conviction of his own rightness:

"He has developed compulsive behaviour based on his own set of high moral values.....This type of personality could qualify as a reason for retirement on medical grounds. If this did occur, it would have to be forced on Mr V, as he can see nothing wrong with his personality and merely considers himself a person of high integrity."

And with their persistence in pursuing authorities to try to get action on their complaints....

"There is every reason to believe he will continue in his present litigious activities writing numerous letters to parliamentarians, ministers and the PM etc. He is quite insightless into his mental condition....." "There seems little doubt that in the last year what had been a highly valued idea by him, that is exposure of corruption in the SRA, has become an obsession in the sense that he both cannot and will not put it out of his mind..."

And at the ‘overestimation of himself’ that caused problems for Soviet psychiatrists: "He was very grandiose regarding his abilities as a quarantine officer......." "..he may in fact have a personality disorder. His personality traits are such as to produce grandiose and obsessive behaviour..."



Hired guns in Workers’ Compensation

In this situation the employee is usually claiming for post-traumatic stress disorder, and the hired gun’s task is to show that he/she does not or could not have such a condition, despite in some cases the precipitating event having been extraordinarily traumatic by normal standards, e.g. the Voyager disaster. More details of such reports can be found in the chapter in the ‘Bullying’ book referred to above. In these cases the hired gun, rather than bending over backwards to find symptoms of psychiatric illness where none exists as in whistleblowing cases, has to perform complicated mental gymnastics to show there is nothing wrong, however compelling the evidence that the plaintiff is genuinely ill.

If the patient shows signs that would normally be taken as symptoms of illness, the hired gun will interpret this as malingering. An example:

"The prominent feature at this interview was what I consider to be overacting. The appearance of great anguish was so excessive that I can only regard it as histrionic. It is my impression that [his complaints] are manufactured for the purposes of elaborating upon what may have been a genuine disorder in the past.............In my opinion the state of the patient no longer meets the criteria of PTSD, but rather impresses me more as malingering hysteria......"

Or he will provoke the patient and interpret their response as indicating hostility rather than legitimate illness. An example:

Claimant’s account of the examination: "I found Dr X’s attitude from the start to be provocative and intimidating. He frequently smirked when I replied to his questions, and the whole interview with him was more in the nature of an interrogation. At a later stage of the interview Dr X sat me in a chair and asked me to hunch up my shoulders. [Dr X has no orthopaedic qualifications or expertise.] I indicated to him that I was in pain and that pushing down caused me pain. He asked me to hunch up my shoulders again and I refused. He pushed down on my shoulders hard."

Dr X’s report of that examination: "He was bristling with anger and hostility. Although diagnosed as suffering from major depression by Drs A and B, I have reservations about the diagnosis and note he failed to respond satisfactorily to any treatment prescribed....."

That patient subsequently killed himself, which would seem to indicate Drs A and B were right about his major depression. He was one of a series of suicides by patients who had been examined in this manner by Dr X, and while it would not be valid to say without further evidence that Dr X’s examinations helped to cause those deaths, it is self-evident that such abusive behaviour could hardly have helped.

Characteristics of hired guns

It appears a disproportionate number are male, although this may be an artefact. (One female psychiatrist featured prominently in the recent series of articles in ‘The Australian’.) Regardless of gender, they are authoritarian, and in many cases seem to have a genuine dislike and distrust of people who are in conflict with authority, as if being in such a situation is evidence the patient must ipso facto be mad or bad. Most do forensic work most or all of the time, i.e. they do not have ongoing contact with patients; and they work only for employers and/or insurance companies, never for plaintiffs. Some make a lot of money. Unlike psychiatrists who cause other kinds of problems, they seem not to be prominent in medical politics, but nevertheless are enough a part of the establishment to avoid any action being taken against them by e.g. the College of Psychiatrists despite sometimes numerous complaints from victims and other psychiatrists.

Tactics of hired guns

The conduct of a typical examination is clearly aimed at avoiding the possibility of developing any rapport or empathy with the patient - the reverse of a normal examination. The hired gun would no doubt deny that this is the intent, but it is hard to find any other explanation. The process usually starts with secret briefings from the employer, usually inaccurate and sometimes wildly misleading, which paint the patient as paranoid or impossible, and which the patient, unaware of their existence, has no chance to refute. The psychiatrist will refuse to accept written information offered by the patient, or to allow a support person into the interview; may arrive late with no explanation or apology; will not introduce himself or otherwise make any attempt at normal politeness or making the patient comfortable; will use distractions such as wandering round the room behind the patient, dropping noisy objects, or sitting with his feet up on the desk, eating his lunch. He will be hostile and adversarial in manner, sometimes yelling at the patient, accusing them of lying, and may be verbally abusive, trying to provoke an angry reaction which can then be used as ‘evidence’ of a personality disorder or malingering, depending what is required.

Other common tactics are to use a standard report that is already on their word-processor, the hired gun simply filling in the gaps. ‘Verballing’ patients is common, e.g. a throw-away, leading question at the end of the interview on the lines of supposing they must have some bitterness about what has happened then becomes the focus of the report. One notorious hired gun regularly uses a urine test for drugs, including prescribed drugs. The patient is asked what they are taking, and the psychiatrist then says in his report that what the patient claimed to be taking or not taking is contradicted by the test - additional ‘evidence’ that the patient is untruthful. Without a witness at the interview, or a tape-recording, there is no independent evidence of what the patient really did say.

There is however one thing that hired guns almost never do - try to check the patient’s information with other, independent, sources. Indeed I think it safe to say that someone who makes such an effort is not a hired gun.

Compliant courts

The over-riding problems with our courts are the adversarial system, which seems designed to hide rather than search for the truth; and presiding judges and magistrates who might as well not be there, for all the good most do in keeping proceedings and participants on the rails. I will not be making suggestions for overall reform of the court system, since Evan Whitton will no doubt be covering that. I will just outline some of the problems. An enormous problem with the whole legal system is the lack of ethics of most legal practitioners, as shown by countless examples of corruption in the system, and the almost complete absence of lawyers prepared to blow the whistle on it. Other people can and do - police for example, often at enormous personal risk - but lawyers almost never.

Before a plaintiff gets to a court hearing, they have to cope with their own lawyers’ incompetence and procrastination. Few lawyers seem to have even basic competence in this area, a major problem being that their training removes any previous tendencies to be goal-directed, so they become entirely process-directed. (Billing by the hour of course encourages this.) Where they are going to end up, and when, seems not to be their concern. And because so many cases in the end are settled (often very badly) out of court, most can’t get motivated to prepare a case until the day before the hearing if you’re lucky, and often not until the day itself. These problems, and lack of money, have led a number of whistleblowers to do a law degree themselves as the only means of finding an ethical and reliable lawyer, and many more to represent themselves without any qualifications - when they seem to do rather better than most whistleblowers with lawyers. Certainly no worse.

Plaintiffs then have to cope with the tactics of large organisations with money, who can and do use the legal processes to exhaust the plaintiffs’ emotional and financial resources, until they are forced to give up and go away, or to settle, usually badly, just before a definitive hearing that could have set a precedent for other victims. The Westpac letters, and the Justice Callinan issue, are examples of what is widespread and accepted practice. I have yet to hear of a judge taking any action - or even saying anything - about these blatant delaying and other tactics. They seem quite happy to preside over an abusive process that also, most conveniently, keeps matters of great public interest ‘sub-judice’ and safe from public scrutiny until they are no longer news.

Plaintiffs also have to cope with their lawyers’ tendency to play for the other side - throwing cases, withdrawing from them the day before they go to court, making deals, persuading bewildered victims to accept ruinously disadvantageous settlements, losing documents, leaking information to the other side etc etc etc. Reasons for this behaviour range from corrupt collusion to simply needing to clear a space in their diary; and of course collecting brownie points for their career.

Plaintiffs also have to cope with the vagaries of the system, and its tendency to compliance with the political and other needs of the day. Name and detail suppression vary with the climate. A whole case in NSW involving a worker in a Minister’s office was suppressed until after the last state election. One wonders how this could possibly be legally necessary, however convenient politically. In the ‘Marsden case’, where Channel 7 is being sued over allegations on the ‘Witness’ program of underage sex the judge refused to suppress the (male) witnesses’ names. Had the witnesses been female I feel that would have been what ‘Yes, Minister’ calls a courageous decision. There is also great reluctance to deal with or even acknowledge some very odd occurrences in and around the system - crucial dates in court records obviously and clumsily altered with white-out; blatant interference with witnesses; disappearing documents; and mysteriously reappearing fire-arms. Judges don’t seem to want to know about such matters. No doubt some are in on the deals, whatever they may be, but I suspect that most are simply reluctant to rock the boat. The needs of justice, and the community, take second place to the desire for a quiet life.

Once in court, plaintiffs face major problems with bullying - an integral part of the adversarial system. Compliant judges make no attempt to see fair play, as vulnerable plaintiffs are bullied by opposing counsel, cross-examined for days on end, about anything at all, no matter how repetitive or irrelevant, regardless of their state of health - often until they collapse and have to give up the case. Whether the plaintiff has suffered a brain injury that is the subject of the case, or is intellectually disabled, psychiatrically or physically ill, or a child, seems to make no difference - judges still sit there and allow this to happen. In one serious instance in NSW, a heavily-pregnant ex-police officer who had blown the whistle on a number of corrupt colleagues testified before the Police Royal Commission. Her evidence lasted one day, justifying, one would think, half a day of cross-examination on what she had said. She was then repetitively cross-examined as to ‘her credit’ (i.e. her entire life history) by a series of lawyers representing each of the police she had named. This had been going on for four days, with no end in sight, when she collapsed in the court, and went into premature labour, having developed pneumonia and septicaemia. The baby, also suffering from septicaemia, was grossly premature, and is seriously and permanently disabled as a result.

The legal system, albeit somewhat reluctantly, does recognise the existence of psychiatric injury, and that it may be legitimate grounds for the award of damages. Many lawyers make profitable careers in this area. Yet psychiatric injuries are inflicted by our court system every day - negligently, and sometimes wilfully as a deliberate strategy - and no-one is ever held accountable. Battered plaintiffs can’t get an AVO against bullying barristers; and can’t sue a judge for neglect of his duty of care to a vulnerable person with a disability. I hesitate to suggest more grist for the dysfunctional legal mill, but perhaps such actions should become a reality?

Suggestions for reform

Psychiatric examinations of workers can be justified in some circumstances. Workers, like anyone else, can really become mentally ill, and if this is affecting their work performance, or colleagues are genuinely concerned about them, it is useful to all concerned - especially the patient - if there is a mechanism for dealing with it. An effective and ethical mechanism will also avoid the problem of hired guns. The essentials are:

* the worker can be required, as a condition of continued employment, to have a psychiatric or other medical assessment

* the worker then sees a doctor of their choice. If they see a psychiatrist, they should be referred by their GP in the normal way

* the employer can supply information to the patient’s GP/psychiatrist if they think it necessary, but this information must be made available to the patient

* the psychiatrist should report on the diagnosis and necessary treatment, if any, to the patient’s GP in the normal way. The only report to the employer should be a certificate of fitness or unfitness for work.

Psychiatric examinations of plaintiffs can also be justified in some circumstances, notably where the claim is one of psychiatric injury. Where the claim is physical, and malingering is suspected, my own view is that covert surveillance etc is far more appropriate than psychiatry. For psychiatric claims, the essentials can be divided into the immediately and easily possible, and the ultimately desirable but more difficult:

* plaintiffs must have a choice of psychiatrist, usually from a list provided by the insurance company

* plaintiffs must be informed by the insurance company that they have the right to take a support person to the interview, and that it is to their advantage to do so

* the psychiatrist must agree to allow a support person to accompany the plaintiff, and/or allow the interview to be recorded

* rudeness and abusive behaviour by a psychiatrist towards a plaintiff with a possible psychiatric injury must lead to his removal from the insurance company’s list

* all psychiatric reports on a patient must be disclosed to the other side

The above measures would prevent most of the abuses. However, the ultimate aim must be to avoid ‘cash for comment’ pressures by making the court, rather than either or both sides, responsible for obtaining the necessary report. Again there should be a panel of doctors, with the plaintiff able to choose. The advantages and savings of time, money and trauma are so obvious, it is equally obvious that only a very powerful set of vested interests could keep the system going as it is.



Jean Lennane, April 2000

Dr Jean Lennane is a psychiatrist now working in private practice in Sydney. An active and vocal unionist during the fourteen years she worked as director of drug and alcohol services at the Rozelle Hospital in Sydney, she was eventually sacked in 1990 for publicly criticising cuts to mental health and drug and alcohol services in the public health system. She then became aware for the first time that the term ‘whistleblowing’ applied to what had happened, found what was then a small body of research on the subject, and became involved in setting up the self-help organisation for whistleblowers now known as Whistleblowers Australia, and adding to the now very substantial body of research.

Jean was founding president of WBA, then vice-president, and is now president again. Since it was founded in mid 1991, WBA has become an influential and almost too respectable body, lobbying for a better deal for whistleblowers - that is, for employers, public and private, to stop shooting the messenger. She has also become aware, from information from the hundreds of whistleblowers who have contacted WBA over the years, that Australia is in deep trouble from widespread corruption, especially in our law-enforcement agencies; also at all levels of our legal system, aided and abetted, regrettably, by some members of her own profession.

 

(SECTION 1983) 42 U.S.C. 1983. - Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia

"Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officer's life if necessary." Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. Upheld: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. The U.S. Supreme Court stated, "Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed."

"An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that falls to allege a crime is within jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. If the arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary manslaughter." Housh v. People, 75 111, 491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v. Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.

"When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justiciable." Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1. "These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully used such force and violence." Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. 1; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.

 
 
-CITE-
18 USC Sec. 241
01/06/97
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 13 - CIVIL RIGHTS
-HEAD-
Sec. 241. Conspiracy against rights
-STATUTE-
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;
or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured -
They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both;
and if death results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill,
they shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life,
or both, or may be sentenced to death.
-SOURCE-
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 696; Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L.
90-284, title I, Sec. 103(a), 82 Stat. 75; Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L.
100-690, title VII, Sec. 7018(a), (b)(1), 102 Stat. 4396; Sept. 13,
1994, Pub. L. 103-322, title VI, Sec. 60006(a), title XXXII, Sec.
320103(a), 320201(a), title XXXIII, Sec. 330016(1)(L), 108 Stat.
1970, 2109, 2113, 2147; Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. 104-294, title VI,
Sec. 604(b)(14)(A), 607(a), 110 Stat. 3507, 3511.)
-MISC1-
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 51 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
321, Sec. 19, 35 Stat. 1092).
Clause making conspirator ineligible to hold office was omitted
as incongruous because it attaches ineligibility to hold office to
a person who may be a private citizen and who was convicted of
conspiracy to violate a specific statute. There seems to be no
reason for imposing such a penalty in the case of one individual
crime, in view of the fact that other crimes do not carry such a
severe consequence. The experience of the Department of Justice is
that this unusual penalty has been an obstacle to successful
prosecutions for violations of the act.
Mandatory punishment provision was rephrased in the alternative.
Minor changes in phraseology were made.
AMENDMENTS
1996 - Pub. L. 104-294, Sec. 607(a), substituted ''any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District'' for ''any State,
Territory, or District'' in first par.
Pub. L. 104-294, Sec. 604(b)(14)(A), repealed Pub. L. 103-322,
Sec. 320103(a)(1). See 1994 Amendment note below.
1994 - Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 330016(1)(L), substituted ''They
shall be fined under this title'' for ''They shall be fined not
more than $10,000'' in third par.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320201(a), substituted ''person in any
State'' for ''inhabitant of any State'' in first par.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320103(a)(2)-(4), in third par.,
substituted ''results from the acts committed in violation of this
section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap,
aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both'' for
''results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life''.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320103(a)(1), which provided for amendment
identical to Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 330016(1)(L), above, was
repealed by Pub. L. 104-294, Sec. 604(b)(14)(A).
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 60006(a), substituted '', or may be
sentenced to death.'' for period at end of third par.
1988 - Pub. L. 100-690 struck out ''of citizens'' after
''rights'' in section catchline and substituted ''inhabitant of any
State, Territory, or District'' for ''citizen'' in text.
1968 - Pub. L. 90-284 increased limitation on fines from $5,000
to $10,000 and provided for imprisonment for any term of years or
for life when death results.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT
Amendment by section 604(b)(14)(A) of Pub. L. 104-294 effective
Sept. 13, 1994, see section 604(d) of Pub. L. 104-294, set out as a
note under section 13 of this title.
SHORT TITLE OF 1996 AMENDMENT
Pub. L. 104-155, Sec. 1, July 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 1392, provided
that: ''This Act (amending section 247 of this title and section
10602 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, enacting
provisions set out as a note under section 247 of this title, and
amending provisions set out as a note under section 534 of Title
28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) may be cited as the 'Church
Arson Prevention Act of 1996'.''

-CITE-
18 USC Sec. 242 01/06/97
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 13 - CIVIL RIGHTS
-HEAD-
Sec. 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law
-STATUTE-
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed
for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if
such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a
dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if
such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or
an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to
death.
-SOURCE-
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 696; Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L.
90-284, title I, Sec. 103(b), 82 Stat. 75; Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L.
100-690, title VII, Sec. 7019, 102 Stat. 4396; Sept. 13, 1994, Pub.
L. 103-322, title VI, Sec. 60006(b), title XXXII, Sec. 320103(b),
320201(b), title XXXIII, Sec. 330016(1)(H), 108 Stat. 1970, 2109,
2113, 2147; Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. 104-294, title VI, Sec.
604(b)(14)(B), 607(a), 110 Stat. 3507, 3511.)
-MISC1-
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 52 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
321, Sec. 20, 35 Stat. 1092).
Reference to persons causing or procuring was omitted as
unnecessary in view of definition of ''principal'' in section 2 of
this title.
A minor change was made in phraseology.
AMENDMENTS
1996 - Pub. L. 104-294, Sec. 607(a), substituted ''any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District'' for ''any State,
Territory, or District''.
Pub. L. 104-294, Sec. 604(b)(14)(B), repealed Pub. L. 103-322,
Sec. 320103(b)(1). See 1994 Amendment note below.
1994 - Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 330016(1)(H), substituted ''shall be
fined under this title'' for ''shall be fined not more than
$1,000'' after ''citizens,''.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320201(b), substituted ''any person in any
State'' for ''any inhabitant of any State'' and ''on account of
such person'' for ''on account of such inhabitant''.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320103(b)(2)-(5), substituted ''bodily
injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section
or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if
death results from the acts committed in violation of this section
or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap,
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both'' for
''bodily injury results shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life''.
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320103(b)(1), which provided for amendment
identical to Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 330016(1)(H), above, was
repealed by Pub. L. 104-294, Sec. 604(b)(14)(B).
Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 60006(b), inserted before period at end '',
or may be sentenced to death''.
1988 - Pub. L. 100-690 inserted ''and if bodily injury results
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both;'' after ''or both;''.
1968 - Pub. L. 90-284 provided for imprisonment for any term of
years or for life when death results.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT
Amendment by section 604(b)(14)(B) of Pub. L. 104-294 effective
Sept. 13, 1994, see section 604(d) of Pub. L. 104-294, set out as a
note under section 13 of this title.
-CROSS-
CROSS REFERENCES
Civil action for deprivation of rights, see section 1983 of Title
42, The Public Health and Welfare.
Equal rights under the law, see section 1981 of Title 42.
Minor offenses tried by United States magistrate judges as
excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401
of this title.
Proceedings in vindication of civil rights, see section 1988 of
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.   
-CROSS-
CROSS REFERENCES
Action for neglect to prevent, see section 1986 of Title 42, The
Public Health and Welfare.
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States, see
section 371 of this title.
Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, see section 1985 of
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.
Proceedings in vindication of civil rights, see section 1988 of
Title 42.
 
  
 
 

At the conclusion of its service, a special grand jury is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3333, by a majority vote of its members, to submit to the district court, potentially for public release, a grand jury report, which must concern either: (1) noncriminal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance in office involving organized crime activity by an appointed public officer or employee, as the basis for a recommendation for removal or disciplinary action; or (2) organized crime conditions in the district, without however being critical of any identified person. ("Public officer or employee" is defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 3333(f) to include Federal, State and local officials.)

Upon receiving a report from a special grand jury, the district court must examine it, together with the minutes of the special grand jury, and accept it, for eventual filing as a public record, if the report is: (1) one of the two types authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a); (2) based upon facts discovered in the course of an authorized criminal investigation; (3) supported by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) if each public officer or employee named in the report was afforded a reasonable opportunity to testify and present witnesses on his/her own behalf before the special grand jury, prior to its filing the report. (It would seem that 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a) necessitates a recording of the proceedings if a special grand jury may issue a grand jury report.)

The wording and the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3332(a) and 3333(b)(1) indicate that a special grand jury should not investigate for the sole purpose of writing a report; the report must emanate from the criminal investigation. At bottom, then, a special grand jury functions essentially like a regular grand jury. It is only after the "completion" of the criminal investigation, when the time is near for discharging the jury, that a report may be submitted to the court under 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a). The grand jury will by that time have exhausted all investigative leads and have found all appropriate indictments.

The "misconduct," "malfeasance," or "misfeasance" that may be the subject of a report (provided it is related to organized criminal activity) must, to some degree, involve willful wrongdoing as distinguished from mere inaction or lack of diligence on the part of the public official. Nonfeasance in office, however, if it is of such serious dimensions as to be equatable with misconduct, may be a basis for a special grand jury report. See S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007.

Reports involving public officials must connect "misconduct," "malfeasance," or "misfeasance" with "organized criminal activity." "Organized criminal activity" should be interpreted as being much broader than "organized crime;" it includes "any criminal activity collectively undertaken." This statement is based upon the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a), not of 18 U.S.C. § 3333, but both sections were part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, making it logical to construe the term the same way for both sections. See 116 Cong. Rec. 35,290 (October 7, 1970).

Before the district court may enter as a public record a special grand jury report concerning appointed public officers or employees, a complex procedure must be followed as set down in 18 U.S.C. § 3333(c).

If a court decides that a report submitted to it by a special grand jury regarding a public officer or employee does not comply with the law, the court may seal the report and keep it secret or, for remedial purposes, order the same grand jury to take additional testimony. For purposes of taking additional testimony, a special grand jury may be extended to serve for longer than thirty-six months (but this is the only exception to the thirty-six months limitation).

If the district court feels that the filing of a special grand jury report as a public record would prejudice the fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, the court is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3333(d) to keep the report sealed during the pendency of that matter. Sealed for such a reason, the report would not be subject to subpoena.

When appropriate, United States Attorneys will deliver copies of grand jury reports, together with the appendices, to the governmental bodies having jurisdiction to discipline the appointed officers and employees whose involvement in "organized criminal activity" is the subject of the report. See 18 U.S.C. § 3333(c)(3). (The prospect of such disciplinary action does not prevent the officer's or employee's being compelled to testify under a grant of immunity.) See In re Reno, 331 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1971).

 
"Because of what appears to be a lawful command on the surface, many Citizens, because of respect for the law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights due to ignorance."
U.S. v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:

Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885)

Justice Bradley, "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.  This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed.  A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance.  It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.  Their motto should be Obsta Principiis."

Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

"It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside supreme law finds lodgement in our constitutional jurisprudence.  No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution."

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.644

"Constitutional  'rights' would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied."

Juliard v. Greeman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)

Supreme Court Justice Field, "There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States... In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it.  All else is withheld."

Mallowy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1

"All rights and safeguards contained in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are equally applicable."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 491; 86 S. Ct. 1603

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no 'rule making' or legislation which would abrogate them."

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 p. 442

"An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."

Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958)

"...in our country the people are sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to them by taking away their citizenship."

Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights."

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)

"The claim and exercise of a Constitution right cannot be converted into a crime"... "a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law".

Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas., 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)

Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.

CORRUPTION OF AUTHORITY:

Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 26 S. Ct. 688 50 L.Ed 1057

United States Senator convicted of, among other things, bribery.

Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S. Ct. at 261 (1882)

"No man [or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the law.  No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.  All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."

*Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 678, 694

Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.

*Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270, 286

Society's commitment to institutional justice requires that judges be solicitous of the rights of persons who come before the court.

*Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 359, 371, 374

Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.

Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438

"Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."

Owen v. City of Independence

"The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority is assured that he will be compensated for his injury."

Perry v. United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358

"I do not understand the government to contend that it is any less bound by the obligation than a private individual would be..."  "It is not the function of our government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error."

*Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533

Before sending a person to jail for contempt or imposing a fine, judges are required to provide due process of law, including strict adherence to the procedural requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure.  Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating but an aggravating factor.

U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)

"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.  No officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity.  All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound to obey it."

"It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives."

Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)

Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.

DISMISSAL OF SUIT:

Note:  [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.]  It can be argued that to dismiss a civil rights action or other lawsuit in which a serious factual pattern or allegation of a cause of action has been made would itself be violating of procedural due process as it would deprive a pro se litigant of equal protection of the law vis a vis a party who is represented by counsel.

Also, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 - Relief from Judgment or Order (a) Clerical Mistakes and (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.

Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)

Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.

Walter Process Equipment v. Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172 (1965)

... in a "motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted".  From this vantage point, courts are reluctant to dismiss complaints unless it appears the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW

Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1942)

"However inept Cochran's choice of words, he has set out allegations supported by affidavits, and nowhere denied, that Kansas refused him privileges of appeal which it afforded to others. ***  The State properly concedes that if the alleged facts pertaining to the suppression of Cochran's appeal were disclosed as being true, ... there would be no question but that there was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)

Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."

Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893), Citations Omitted

"Undoubtedly it (the Fourteenth Amendment) forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights... It is enough that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class.  ...And due process of law within the meaning of the [Fifth and Fourteenth] amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."

Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885)

"The rule of equality... requires the same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constitutents of each class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances".

Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332

"Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application fo the law.  'All men are equal before the law,' "This is a government of laws and not of men,' 'No man is above the law,' are all maxims showing the spirit in which legislatures, executives, and courts are expected to make, execute and apply laws.  But the framers and adopters of the (Fourtheenth) Amendment were not content to depend... upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by local public opinion.  They therefore embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty."

HABEUS CORPUS:

Duncan v. Bradley, No. 01-55290 (9th Circ., 12-24-02)

A state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on an entrapment defense, in a second trial on drug sale charges, amounted to prejudicial constitutional error where evidence presented at a first trial warranted such an instruct.  To read entire text of the opinion, see http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0155290p.pdf

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY:

See Judicial Immunity page for more citations (links) and news articles regarding the topic.

See also, 42 USC 1983 - Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.

Note:  [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.]  Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions.  Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial duties, or for violating a citizen's constitutional rights.  When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act.

Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment (and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I, Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit such, stating, "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States" and "No state shall... grant any Title of Nobility."  Most of us are certain that Congress itself doesn't understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges.

Article III, Sec. 1, "The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior."

Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516, "Federal tort law:  judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants' civil rights." - Robert Craig Waters. 

Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859)

"No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence."

Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100

Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion at page 140 said, "If (federal judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted."  Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion at page 141) said, "Judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted and punished for crimes... The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution".

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)

Note:  Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land.  The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it". See also In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).

Cooper v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133

There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign.

Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)

A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts.

Forrester  v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S. Ct. at 544-545 (1987); Westfall v.Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1987); United States v. Lanier (March 1997)

Constitutionally and in fact of law and judicial rulings, state-federal "magistrates-judges" or any government actors, state or federal, may now be held liable, if they violate any Citizen's Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, or guarantees; including statutory civil rights.

A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.

Gregory v. Thompson, F.2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)

Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92 Okla 32, 227 F. 417

"The courts are not bound by an officer's interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act."

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)

"... the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."

"In declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank".

"All law (rules and practices) which are repugnant to the Constitution are VOID".

Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states "NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, ...  or equal protection under the law", this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional. 

Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)

"Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction."

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984); 104 S. Ct. 1781, 1980, 1981, and 1985

In 1996, Congress passed a law to overcome this ruling which stated that judicial immunity doesn't exist; citizens can sue judges for prospective injunctive relief.

"Our own experience is fully consistent with the common law's rejection of a rule of judicial immunity.  We never have had a rule of absolute judicial immunity.  At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity... to prevent irreparable injury to a citizen's constitutional rights..."

"Subsequent interpretations of the Civil Rights Act by this Court acknowledge Congress' intent to reach unconstitutional actions by all state and federal actors, including judges... The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state [federal] from denying any person [citizen] within its jurisdiction the equal protection under the laws.  Since a State [or federal] acts only by its legislative, executive or judicial authorities, the constitutional provisions must be addressed to those authorities, including state and federal judges..."

"We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar to relief against a judicial officer acting in her [his] judicial capacity."

Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 at 288 (1991)

A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity; however, even in a case involving a particular attorney not assigned to him, he may reach out into the hallway, having his deputy use "excessive force" to haul the attorney into the courtroom for chastisement or even incarceration.  A Superior Court Judge is broadly vested with "general jurisdiction."  Provided the judge is not divested of all jurisdiction, he may have his actions excused as per this poor finding. 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)

Note:  By law, a judge is a state officer.  The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).  When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the Judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges' orders are not voidable, but VOID, and of no legal force or effect.

The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.  The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."

Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349

Some Defendants urge that any act "of a judicial nature" entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity.  But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing.

A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.

Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc, criticized the "judicial nature" analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily restrictive.  But Rankin's ultimate result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction.

U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (State use of), 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697

When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction.

U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)

"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.  No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.  All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."

"It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives."

Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326

When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.

JURISDICTION:

NOTE:  It is a fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when challenged, prove that jurisdiction exists; mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished. 

Albrecht v. U.S.

Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)

"The United States District Court is not a true United States Court, established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed.  It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States.  The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court."

Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d 906

Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633

Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.  They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them.  They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers."

Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)

Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases.

Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149

Mack v. United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia

"The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.  It matters not whether policy making is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."

Mack v. United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia

"Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete and enumerated ones."

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1

Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)

"The term 'District Courts of the United States' as used in the rules without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance.  It describes the constitutional courts created under Article 3 of the Constitution.  Courts of the Territories are Legislative Courts, properly speaking, and are not district courts of the United States.  We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the district courts of the United States (98 U.S. 145) does not make it a 'District Court of the United States'.

"Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the application of the rules the territorial court and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended."

McNutt v. General Motors, 298 U.S. 178

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)

"We have held, however, that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction."

Owens v. The City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980)

Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976)

"It is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal argument."

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY (DEMONSTRATIONS):

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347; 6 S. Ct. 2673; 49 L. Ed. 2d (1976)

"Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."

Miller v. U.S., 230 F. 2d. 486, 490; 42

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one, because of his exercise of constitutional rights."

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105

"No state shall convert a liberty into a license, and charge a fee therefore."

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Alabama, 373 U.S. 262

"If the State converts a right (liberty) into a privilege, the citizen can ignore the license and fee and engage in the right (liberty) with impunity."

United States Constitution, First Amendment

Right to Petition; Freedom of Association.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Brinegar v. U.S., 388 US 160 (1949)

Probable Cause to Arrest - Provides details on how to determine if a crime has been or is being committed.

Carroll v. U.S., 267 US 132 (1925)

Probable Cause to Search - Provides details on the belief that seizable property exists in a particular place or on a particular person.

Draper v. U.S. (1959)

Probable cause is where known facts and circumstances, of a reasonably trustworthy nature, are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being committed.  Reasonable man definition; common textbook definition; comes from this case.

PRO SE RIGHTS:

Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425

Litigants can be assisted by unlicensed laymen during judicial proceedings.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)

"Following the simple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice"... "The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."  The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice.

Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449

"The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, are not to be defeated under the name of local practice."

Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905

"... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws."

Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 17, 28 USCA "Next Friend"

A next friend is a person who represents someone who is unable to tend to his or her own interest.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)

"Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient"... "which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox,  456 2nd 233

Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.

Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)

"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants.  They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end.  Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment."

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415); United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969)

Members of groups who are competent nonlawyers can assist other members of the group achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged with "unauthorized practice of law."

Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals

The plaintiff's civil rights pleading was 150 pages and described by a federal judge as "inept".  Nevertheless, it was held "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities."

Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)

It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section). 

Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)

"Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law." 

Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights."

Schware v. Board of Examiners, United State Reports 353 U.S. pages 238, 239. 

"The practice of law cannot be licensed by any state/State."

Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925)

"The practice of law is an occupation of common right."

 

TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 96 - RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994)


Sec. 1961. Definitions

Sec. 1962. Prohibited activities

Sec. 1963. Criminal penalties

Sec. 1964. Civil remedies

Sec. 1965. Venue and process

Sec. 1966. Expedition of actions

Sec. 1967. Evidence

Sec. 1968. Civil investigative demand

Sec. 1961. Definitions

As used in this chapter -

(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices), section 1081 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relating to the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport), section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits and other documents), sections 1581-1588 (relating to peonage and slavery), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, or (F) any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain.

(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof;

(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;

(7) "racketeering investigator" means any attorney or investigator so designated by the Attorney General and charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter;

(8) "racketeering investigation" means any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of any final order, judgment, or decree of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this chapter;

(9) "documentary material" includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material; and

(10) "Attorney General" includes the Attorney General of the United States, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, the Associate Attorney General of the United States, any Assistant Attorney General of the United States, any Assistant Attorney General of the United States, or any employee of the Department of Justice or any employee of any department or agency of the United States so designated by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter. Any department or agency so designated may use in investigations authorized by this chapter either the investigative provisions of this chapter or the investigative power of such department or agency otherwise conferred by law.

 


Sec. 1962. Prohibited activities

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketerring activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of any unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

 


Sec. 1963 . Criminal penalties.

(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law -

any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962;


any -
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and


any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962. The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.

(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes -

real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and

tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims and securities.


(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (1) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonable without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.

(d)

Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section -
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that

(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed form the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered: Provided, however, that an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effective for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A) has been filed.


A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more than ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for a longer period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under this paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.


The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant to this subsection, evidence and information that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

(e) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall enter a judgment of forfeiture of the property to the United States and shall also authorize the Attorney General to seize all property ordered forfeited upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. Following the entry of an order declaring the property forfeited, the court may, upon application of the United States, enter such appropriate restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the United States in the property ordered forfeited. Any income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an interest in an enterprise which has been ordered forfeited under this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect the interest of the United States or third parties.

(f) Following the seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the Attorney General shall direct the disposition of the property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making due provision of the rights of any innocent persons. Any property right or interest not exercisable by, or transferable for value to, the United States shall expire and shall not revert to the defendant, nor shall the defendant or any person acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant be eligible to purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the United States. Upon application of a person, other than the defendant or a person acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant, the court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the property pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the sale or disposition of the property will result in irreparable injury, harm or loss to him. Notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. 3302(b), the proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property forfeited under this section and any moneys forfeited shall be used to pay all proper expenses for the forfeiture and the sale, including expenses of seizure, maintenance and custody of the property pending its disposition, advertising and court costs. The Attorney General shall deposit in the Treasure any amounts of such proceeds or moneys remaining after the payment of such expenses.

(g) With respect to property ordered forfeited under this section, the Attorney General is authorized to -

grant petitions for mitigation or remission of forfeiture, restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other action to protect the rights of innocent persons which is in the interest of justice and which is not inconsistent with the provision of this chapter;

compromise claims arising under this section;

award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a forfeiture under this section;

direct the disposition by the United States of all property ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other commercially feasible means, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons; and

take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain property ordered forfeited under this section pending its disposition.

(h) The Attorney General may promulgate regulations with respect to -

making reasonable efforts to provide notice to persons who may have an interest in property ordered forfeited under this section;

granting petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture;

the restitution of property to victims of an offense petitioning for remission or mitigation of forfeiture under this chapter;

the disposition by the United States of forfeited property by public sale or other commercially feasible means;

the maintenance and safekeeping of any property forfeited under this section pending its disposition; and

the compromise of claims arising under this chapter. Pending the promulgation of such regulations, all provisions of law relating to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the Customs Service or any person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs law shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney General.

(i) Except as provided in subsection (1), no party claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture under this section may -

intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under this section; or

commence an action at law or equity against the United States concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the property subsequent to the filing of an indictment or information alleging that the property is subject to forfeiture under this section.

(j) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter orders as provided in this section without regard to the location of any property which may be subject to forfeiture under this section or which has been ordered forfeited under this section.

(k) In order to facilitate the identification or location of property declared forfeited and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring property forfeited to the United States the court may, upon application of the United States, order that the testimony of any witness relating to the property forfeited be taken by deposition and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material not privileged be produced at the same time and place, in the same manner as provided for the taking of depositions under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(l)

Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the United States shall publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the property in such manner as the Attorney General may direct. The Government may also, to the extent practicable, provide direct written notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture as a substitute for published notice as to those persons so notified.

Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may, within thirty days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice under paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be held before the court alone, without a jury.

The petition shall be signed by the petitioner under penalty of perjury and shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the property, any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and the relief sought.

The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with the interest of justice, be held within thirty days of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate the hearing on the petition with a hearing on any other petition filed by a person other than the defendant under this subsection.

At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence and witnesses on his own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. The United States may present evidence and witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of its claim to the property and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall consider the relevant portions of the record of the criminal case which resulted in the order of forfeiture.

If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that -
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section; the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its determination.


Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under this subsection, or if no such petitions are filed following the expiration of the period provided in paragraph (2) for the filing of such petitions, the United States shall have clear title to property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture and may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or transferee.

(m) if any of the property described n subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission of the defendant -

cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

has been substantially diminished in value; or

has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty, the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).


Sec. 1964. Civil remedies

(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.

(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.

(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.

(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.


Sec. 1965. Venue and process

(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.

(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.

(c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United States under this chapter in the district court of the United States for any judicial district, subpoenas issued by such court to compel the attendance of witnesses may be served in any other judicial district, except that in any civil action or proceeding no such subpoena shall be issue for service upon any individual who resides in another district at a place more than one hundred miles from the place at which such court is held without approval given by a judge of such court upon a showing of good cause.

(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.


Sec. 1966. Expedition of actions

In any civil action instituted under this chapter by the United States in any district court of the United States, the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a certificate stating that in his opinion the case is of general public importance. a copy of that certificate shall be furnished immediately by such clerk to the chief judge or in his absence to the presiding district judge of the district in which such action is pending. Upon receipt of such copy, such judge shall designate immediately a judge of that district to hear and determine action.


Sec. 1967. Evidence

In any proceeding ancillary to or in any civil action instituted by the United States under this chapter the proceedings may be open or closed to the public at the discretion of the court after consideration of the rights of affected persons.


Sec. 1968. Civil investigative demand

(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person or enterprise may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary materials relevant to a racketeering investigation, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such material for examination.

(b) Each such demand shall -


(1) state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged racketeering violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto;

(2) describe the class or classes of documentary material produced there under with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified;

(3) state that the demand is returnable forthwith or prescribe a return date which will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so demanded may be assembled and made available for inspection and copying or reproduction; and

(4) identify the custodian to whom such material shall be made available.

(c) No such demand shall -

(1) contain any requirement which would be held to be unreasonable if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged racketeering violation; or

(2) require the production of any documentary evidence which would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged racketeering violation.

(d) Service of any such demand or any petition filed under this section may be made upon a person by -

(1) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any partner, executive officer, managing agent, or general agent thereof, or to any agent thereof authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of such person, or upon any individual person;

(2) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the principal office or place of business of the person to be served; or

(3) depositing such copy in the United States mail, by registered or certified mail duly addressed to such person at its principal office or place of business.

(e) A verified return by the individual serving any such demand or petition setting forth the manner of such service shall be prima facie proof of such service. In the case of service by registered or certified mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office receipt of delivery of such demand.

(f)

The Attorney General shall designate a racketeering investigator to serve as racketeer document custodian, and such additional racketeering investigators as he shall determine from time to time to be necessary to serve as deputies to such officer.


Any person upon whom any demand issued under this section has been duly served shall make such material available for inspection and copying or reproduction to the custodian designated therein at the principal place of business of such person, or at such other place as such custodian and such person thereafter may agree and prescribe in writing or as the court may direct, pursuant to this section on the return date specified in such demand, or on such later date as such custodian may prescribe in writing. Such person may upon written agreement between such person and the custodian substitute for copies of all or any part of such material originals thereof.


The custodian to whom any documentary material is so delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be responsible for the use made thereof and for the return thereof pursuant to this chapter. The custodian may cause the preparation of such copies of such documentary material as may be required for official use under regulations which shall be promulgated by the Attorney General. While in the possession of the custodian, no material so produced shall be available for examination, without the consent of the person who produced such material, by any individual other than the Attorney General. Under such reasonable terms and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, documentary material while in the possession of the custodian shall be available for examination by the person who produced such material or any duly authorized representatives of such person.


Whenever any attorney has been designated to appear on behalf of the United States before any court or grand jury in any case or proceeding involving any alleged violation of this chapter, the custodian may deliver to such attorney such documentary material in the possession of the custodian as such attorney determines to be required for use in the presentation of such case or proceeding on behalf of the United States. Upon the conclusion of any such case or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian any documentary material so withdrawn which has not passed into the control of such court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or proceeding.


Upon the completion of -
(i) the racketeering investigation for which any documentary material was produced under this chapter, and
(ii) any case or proceeding arising from such investigation, the custodian shall return to the person who produced such material all such material other than copies thereof made by the Attorney General pursuant to this subsection which has not passed into the control of any court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or proceeding.

When any documentary material has been produced by any person under this section for use in any racketeering investigation, and no such case or proceeding arising there from has been instituted within a reasonable time after completion of the examination and analysis of all evidence assembled in the course of such investigation, such person shall be entitled, upon written demand made upon the Attorney General, to the return of all documentary material other than copies thereof made pursuant to this subsection so produced by such person.

In the event of the death, disability, or separation from service of the custodian of any documentary material produced under any demand issued under this section or the official relief of such custodian from responsibility for the custody and control of such material, the Attorney General shall promptly -
(i) designate another racketeering investigator to serve as custodian thereof, and
(ii) transmit notice in writing to the person who produced such material as to the identity and address of the successor so designated. Any successor so designated shall have with regard to such materials all duties and responsibilities imposed by this section upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto, except that he shall not be held responsible for any default or dereliction which occurred before his designation as custodian.

(g) Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand duly served upon him under this section or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any such material cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such material, the Attorney General may file, in the district court of the United States for any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of this section, except that if such person transacts business in more than one such district such petition shall be filed in the district in which such person maintains his principal place of business, or in such other district in which such person transacts business as may be agreed upon by the parties to such petition.

(h) Within twenty days after the service of any such demand upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified in the demand, whichever period is shorter, such person may file, in the district court of the United States for the judicial district within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting aside such demand. The time allowed for compliance with the demand in whole or in part as deemed proper and ordered by the court shall not run during the pendency of such petition in the court. Such petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be based upon any failure of such demand to comply with the provisions of this section or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person.

(i) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or control of any documentary material delivered by any person in compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the district court of the United States for the judicial district within which the office of such custodian is situated, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such court requiring the performance by such custodian of any duty imposed upon him by this section.

(j) Whenever any petition is filed in any district court of the United States under this section, such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter so presented, and to enter such order or orders as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this section.

 

Organized crime refers to a self-perpetuating, structured and disciplined association of individuals who combine for the purpose of obtaining monetary gains or profits, either wholly or in part, through illegal means. These groups generally engage in such illegal enterprises as drug trafficking, gambling, loan sharking, extortion, theft, arson, weapons trafficking, labor racketeering, pornography, prostitution, and money laundering. They often use extortion, graft, corruption, violence or threat of violence to achieve their objectives



The FBI defines organized crime as any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole.

COMPLICITY


§ 23.01 General Principles


[A] Common law – One is an accomplice in the commission of an offense if he intentionally assists another to engage in the conduct that constitutes the crime. Accomplice activity may include aiding, abetting, encouraging, soliciting, advising, and procuring the commission of the offense.

Accomplice liability is derivative in nature. In general, the accomplice may be convicted of any offense committed by the primary party with the accomplice’s intentional assistance. Most jurisdictions extend liability to any other offense that was a natural and probable consequence of the crime solicited, aided or abetted.


[B] Model Penal Code – The Code rejects the common law natural-and-probable-consequences rule. Thus, an accomplice may only be held liable under the Code for acts that he purposefully commits.


§ 23.02 Parties to the Complicity



[A] Principal in the First Degree – A "principal in the first degree" is one who, with the mens rea required for the commission of the offense: (1) physically commits the acts that constitute the offense; or (2) commits the offense by use of an "innocent instrumentality" or "innocent human agent." The innocent-instrumentality rule provides that a person is the principal in the first degree if, with the mens rea required for the commission of the offense, he uses a non-human agent (e.g., a trained dog) or a non-culpable human agent to commit the crime.


[B] Principal in the Second Degree – A "principal in the second degree" is one who intentionally assisted in the commission of a crime in the presence, either actual or constructive, of the principal in the first degree. A person is "constructively" present if he is situated in a position to assist the principal in the first degree during the commission of the crime, e.g., serving as a "lookout" or "getaway" driver outside a bank that the principal in the first degree robs.


[C] Accessory Before the Fact – An "accessory before the fact" is one who is not actually or constructively present when the crime is committed; often such person solicits, counsels, or commands (short of coercing) the principal in the first degree to commit the offense.


[D] Accessory After the Fact – An "accessory after the fact" is one who, with knowledge of another’s guilt, intentionally assists the him to avoid arrest, trial, or conviction. The conduct of the accessory after the fact occurs after the completion of the crime. If an accomplice is involved prior to the completion, i.e., up to the point when the principal in the first degree has reached a place of temporary safety, the accomplice is in fact a principal in the second degree. Today, nearly all jurisdictions treat the offense of accessory after the fact as separate from, and often less serious than, the felony committed by the principal in the first degree.


§ 23.03 Acts Giving Rise to Accomplice Liability


[A] Common Law

[1] Types of Assistance – An accomplice is a person who, with the requisite mens rea, assists the primary party in committing an offense. Generally speaking, there are three basic types of assistance:

1.) assistance by physical conduct (e.g., furnishing an instrumentality to commit an offense, "casing" the scene in advance, locking the door to keep an assault victim from escaping, or driving a "getaway" car from the scene of the crime);

2.) assistance by psychological influence (e.g., incitement, solicitation, or encouragement); and

3.) assistance by omission (if there exists a duty to act). A person is not an accomplice simply because he knowingly fails to prevent the commission of an offense, but such failure to act may serve as a critical factor in determining that he assisted by psychological influence.


[2] Amount of Assistance Required – A person is not an accomplice unless his conduct (or omission) in fact assists in the commission of the offense. However, the degree of aid or influence provided is immaterial; even trivial assistance suffices. Furthermore, a secondary party is accountable for the conduct of the primary party even if his assistance was causally unnecessary to the commission of the offense.

[3] The Pinkerton Doctrine – In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), two parties conspired to violate certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and thereafter, while one co-conspirator was in prison for unrelated reasons, the other carried out the plan. Emerging from this case is the "Pinkerton doctrine" under which a party to a conspiracy is responsible for any criminal act committed by an associate if it:

1.) falls within the scope of the conspiracy; or

2.) is a foreseeable consequence of the unlawful agreement.


[B] Model Penal Code – A person is guilty of an offense if he commits it "by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both." Accomplice liability is founded on:

(1) Accountability through an innocent instrumentality – The Code explicitly provides that the innocent-instrumentality doctrine applies only if one causes another to engage in the conduct in question.

(2) Accomplice accountability – One is an accomplice if, with the requisite mens rea, he solicits, aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid in the planning or commission of the offense, or has a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, but makes no effort to do so. [MPC § 2.06(2), (3)(a)]

(3) Miscellaneous accountability – Legislatures may enact special laws of accomplice liability, e.g., prohibiting the aiding and abetting of a suicide attempt, [MPC § 210.5(2)] or criminalizing the knowing facilitation of a prison escape. [MPC § 242.6]

The Model Code rejects the Pinkerton doctrine of conspiratorial liability. Thus, a person is not accountable for the conduct of another solely because he conspired with that person to commit an offense. The liability of one who does not personally commit an offense must be based on accountability through an innocent instrumentality, accomplice accountability, or miscellaneous accountability.

§ 23.04 Mens rea in Complicity Offenses

[A] Common and Statutory Law

[1] "Intent" – The mens rea of accomplice liability is usually described in terms of "intention." As with the crime of conspiracy, however, there is considerable debate regarding whether a person may properly be characterized as an accomplice if he knows that his assistance will aid in a crime, but he lacks the purpose that the crime be committed. Most courts, however, hold that a person is not an accomplice in the commission of an offense unless he shares the criminal intent with the principal.

[2] Recklessness and Negligence – Although courts and statutes frequently express the culpability requirement for accomplice liability in terms of "intent," the majority rule is that accomplice liability may nevertheless attach in cases of crimes involving recklessness or negligence.

[B] Model Penal Code – The Code person resolves the common law ambiguity as to whether complicity requires purpose or mere knowledge of the consequences of their conduct. Under the Code, accomplice liability exists only if one assists "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense." [MPC § 2.06(3)(a)]

Accomplice liability may also be found in cases involving recklessness or negligence when causing a particular result is an element of a crime:

1.) he was an accomplice in the conduct that caused the result; and

2.) he acted with the culpability, if any, regarding the result that is sufficient for commission of the offense. [MPC § 2.06(4)]


§ 23.05 Liability of the Secondary Party In Relation to the Primary Party

[A] Common Law – At common law, an accessory could not be convicted of the crime in which he assisted until the principal was convicted and, with the limited exception of criminal homicide, could not be convicted of a more serious offense or degree of offense than that of which the principal was convicted.

[B] Modern Rule – Today, the majority rule is that a conviction (or even a prosecution) of the principal in the first degree is not a prerequisite to the conviction of a secondary party. Non-prosecution of the principal might result from any one of numerous factors extraneous to his guilt (e.g., death, flight from the jurisdiction, or immunity from prosecution), and thus, does not in itself prove that a crime did not occur.

Furthermore, even if the principal is prosecuted but acquitted on the basis of an excuse defense, his acquittal should not bar a prosecution and conviction of a secondary party to whom the excuse does not extend. An acquittal on the ground of an excuse means that the actions of the primary party were wrongful, but that he was not responsible for them because of the excusing condition. However, since accomplice liability is derivative, there must be proof at the accomplice’s trial of the principal’s guilt.

An accomplice or accessory may be convicted of a more serious offense than is proved against the primary party.

[C] Model Penal Code – An accomplice in the commission of an offense may be convicted of a crime, upon proof of its commission by another person, regardless of whether the other person is convicted, acquitted, or prosecuted. Furthermore, an accomplice may be convicted of a different offense or different degree of offense than is the primary party. [MPC § 2.06(7)] The Code also expressly provides that a person who is legally incapable of committing an offense personally may be held accountable for the crime if it is committed by another person for whom he is legally accountable. [MPC § 2.06(5)]

§ 23.06 Limits to Accomplice Liability

[A] Common Law

[1] Legislative-Exemption Rule – A person may not be prosecuted as an accomplice in the commission of a crime if he is a member of the class of persons for whom the statute prohibiting the conduct was enacted to protect. For example, in a case of statutory rape, an underage female who engages in sexual intercourse cannot be prosecuted as a secondary party to her own statutory rape since the law was enacted to protect young females from immature decisions regarding sex.

[2] Abandonment – As with the law of conspiracy, many courts hold that a person who provides assistance to another for the purpose of promoting or facilitating the offense, but who subsequently abandons the criminal endeavor, can avoid accountability for the subsequent criminal acts of the primary party. The accomplice must do more than spontaneously and silently withdraw from the criminal activity. He must communicate his withdrawal to the principal and attempt to neutralize the effect of his prior assistance.

[B] Model Penal Code – A person is not an accomplice in the commission of an offense if:

(1) he is the victim of the offense;

(2) his conduct is "inevitably incident" to the commission of the offense;

(3) he terminates his participation before the crime is committed, and:

a) neutralizes his assistance;

b) gives timely warning to the police of the impending offense; or

c) attempts to prevent the commission of the crime.

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